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The Nature and Minimum Standards of
Freedom of Religion or Belief
Natan Lerner ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
This article provides an overview of the nature and scope of the
minimum standards for freedom of religion or belief in the international community, as regulated by the principal international norms.
Although the international community had already addressed racial
discrimination, racial hatred, and other human rights issues, the
United Nations did not address racial and religious discrimination
and intolerance until the early sixties, following a series of antiSemitic outbreaks. The United Nations separated the issues and
promptly drafted a declaration and convention against racial discrimination. However, the United Nations did not draft a declaration regarding religion and belief until 1981. Moreover, it does not
appear the United Nations will draft a convention regarding religion
and belief any time soon, for reasons discussed hereafter.1
International organizations have adopted measures intended to
guarantee freedom of religion or belief at the global and regional
levels. These measures have also had some influence on domestic leg∗ The author teaches international law at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya and
international human rights at the Faculty of Law of Tel Aviv University, from which he retired
as an associate professor. Mr. Lerner is the author of the following books: RELIGION, BELIEFS
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991); and THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY (1970).
1. See infra Part IV.C.4. Scholarly literature regarding human rights was criticized for
similarly failing to sufficiently address religion, belief, and related issues. This deficiency has
been remedied in recent years. Today, there are a fair number of books and articles available
that address religion and beliefs and the minimum standards and norms that prevail in the area.
See, e.g., MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE
(1997); NATAN LERNER, RELIGION, BELIEFS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2000);
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS (Ted Stahnke & J. Paul Martin eds.,
1998); RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Johan
D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS];
BAHIYYIH G. TAHZIB, FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: ENSURING EFFECTIVE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION (1996).
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islation. The measures address issues such as (1) the nature, scope,
and other substantive aspects of freedom of religion or belief; innerand outer-religious freedoms; the expression and manifestation of
the freedom; permissible limitations and derogation of the freedom;
and how the freedom clashes or interacts with other individual and
collective rights, and (2) the procedural aspects available to protect
individuals’ fundamental rights of freedom of religion or belief, including freedom from religion. Some countries have unilaterally addressed the second issue, while other countries have entered into
special arrangements with other countries, churches, religious communities, and congregations.
This article attempts to briefly inventory these measures, which
govern the sensitive issue of freedom of religion or belief. Where appropriate, this article also refers to other international instruments
that indirectly impact freedom of religion or belief and to the interaction between freedom of religion or belief and other rights, including the freedoms of expression, association, and communication;
gender rights; the rights of indigenous people and other special
populations, such as migrant workers; educational rights; and children’s rights. This article also alludes to problems concerning the relationship between the religious group and its individual members
and the religious group (be it a religious congregation or community) and the state. Other articles in this Symposium address several
of these issues in more depth.
II. THE NEED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ADDRESS
FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF
With the beginning of a new millennium, the international
community’s continued efforts and interest in development, advancement, and technology present the ineluctable question of
whether the international community is likewise ready to make additional advancements in the area of freedom of religion or belief by,
perhaps, adopting a mandatory treaty based upon an existing draft or
other instrument. Conversely, if the international community sees
this next step as premature, undesirable, or risky, the question becomes whether it is possible to agree upon another way to place
freedom of religion or belief on equal footing with other basic human rights.
None of the several suggestions and proposals to that effect adequately answer why this essential manifestation of human liberty has
906
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received less attention than other fundamental rights. Indeed, religion profoundly impacts the state of the world. Tragic events that
demonstrate the powerful influence of ethnicity and religion, and in
some cases require the intervention of massive international force,
are but additional proof that religion plays a weighty role in xenophobia, racism, group hatred, and even territorial changes. Furthermore, religious persecution and conflicts between believers and nonbelievers; between different churches in multireligious societies; between dominating, protected, or preferred religions and religious
minorities; and between newly established religions are all common
phenomena. Some even argue that a shift from violence between
sovereign states to conflicts between ethnic and religious groups is
taking place.2 In fact, the problem is so pervasive that the United
States, the major political force in the world, considered it necessary
to go through the complicated legislative process (legally and otherwise) to enact domestic legislation to protect endangered religious
groups abroad.3 These problems, and the United States’ response,
suggest the time is ripe for the international community to give
equal attention to freedom of religion or belief.
III. “RELIGION” DEFINED
The notion of “religion” is difficult to define in legal terms. To
avoid philosophical and ideological controversy, international and
human rights law have prescribed a catalog of rights and the means
of protecting those rights, under the agreed heading of “freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion,” rather than defining the freedoms themselves. All of the basic instruments refer to these three
freedoms. Moreover, most of the developed international norms protect the manifestations or expressions of the freedom of religion or
belief.4
2. See TRANSNATIONAL RELIGION AND FADING STATES 3-4 (Susanne Hober Rudolf &
James Piscatori eds., 1997). See also SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996), which caused considerable controversy.
3. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (1999); International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112
Stat. 2787 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (1998)).
4. Problems exist with regard to new religious movements and sects, an issue that
sparked emotional debates in many countries and led some to enact special provisions. The
United Nations Rapporteur on Religious Freedom has dealt with this subject in his recent reports. See the reports submitted by Abdelfattah Amor to the Commission on Human Rights
since his appointment in 1987, the last of which is, before this writing, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
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A major politically-motivated confrontation between Western
and Communist countries was avoided by inserting “belief” after
“religion.” The terms are intended to refer to both theistic views of
the universe, as well as atheistic, agnostic, rationalistic, and other
views excluding religion and religious norms.5
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
A. Early Protection of Religious Freedom
Historically, the protection of religious freedom preceded the
protection of other rights.6 It commenced with provisions in bilateral
treaties modifying the traditional rule, cuius regio eius religio, a weak,
limited ad hoc system that only worked in favor of those religious
minorities that a signatory state sought to protect, usually on the
grounds of reciprocity.7 Other states unilaterally extended diplomatic
protection to persecuted religious minorities. Still other states
adopted the principle of religious tolerance and promulgated some
rules on religious freedom in their legislation.8 The Augsburg
(1555), Westphalia (1648), and Vienna (1815) treaties were important stages in this development, showing that the international
community was relatively accepting of the principle of humanitarian

58 (1999). On June 22, 1999, the Council of Europe adopted the Recommendation 1412,
Illegal Activities of Sects, EUR. PARL. ASS. DEB. 18TH Sess. (June 22, 1999). The Council considered it “undesirable” to enact major legislation on sects and reaffirmed its commitment to
freedom of conscience and religion. Id.
5. I have listed judicial attempts to define religion and references from legal dictionaries in my book, LERNER, supra note 1, at 3-4. See also TAHZIB, supra note 1, at 1-3;
RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1.
6. See John P. Humphrey, Political and Related Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 171, 176 (Theodor Meron ed., 1985); Karl Josef Partsch, Freedom of
Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS
209 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (1983).
7. At this stage (the 16th century) the abandonment of this traditional rule—that the
sovereign’s religion should be the religion of everyone under his jurisdiction—did not imply
the establishment of a general freedom of religion.
8. On these early developments, see ALESSANDRA LUINI DEL RUSSO, INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1971). See also, EVANS, supra note 1, at 42. On religious
rights and minorities, see generally Natan Lerner, The Evolution of Minority Rights in International Law, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77-101 (Catherine Brolmann et al. eds., 1993), and PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RIGHTS OF
MINORITIES (1991).
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intervention. Such intervention was on pragmatic grounds, however,
without any philosophical or legal justification. This period culminated with the French and American revolutions.9
B. Post-World War I Protection of Religious Freedom
The next relevant step toward the protection of religious freedom was the unsuccessful, but interesting, regime that developed after World War I based upon Article 22 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations, which guaranteed freedom of conscience and religion. Treaties and states’ unilateral statements on religious freedom
sought to ensure the protection of national, ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic minorities.10 This protection included individual
and collective religious rights. This system failed, however, with the
breakdown of the League of Nations, a consequence of the general
political situation preceding World War II.
C. Post-World War II Protection of Religious Freedom
After the 1945 San Francisco Conference and the establishment
of the United Nations, the international community, suspicious of
the validity and genuineness of the assertion of collective and group
(including religious group) rights, shifted its emphasis from protecting collective and group rights to affording protection to individual
persons on the basis of individual rights and nondiscrimination. Persons whose rights were violated or jeopardized because of a group
characteristic—be it race, color, religion, ethnic or national origin,
culture, or language—would now be protected purely on an individual basis.11 The issue of minority group rights, although not com9. On religious rights under national law, see ARCOT KRISHNASWAMI, STUDY OF
DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND PRACTICES, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2, U.N. Sales No. 60.XIV.2 (1960).
10. The literature on the minority treaties is immense and cannot be listed here. Recent
works include FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO
ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES (1991), especially Chapter IV; Felix Ermacora, The Protection of Minorities Before the United Nations, in RECUEIL DES COURS 182/IV
247, 347 (1983); NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991); THORNBERRY, supra note 8; and THE PROTECTION OF
MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1992). On the interwar experience, see JACOB ROBINSON ET AL., WERE THE MINORITIES TREATIES A FAILURE?
(1943).
11. See Lerner, supra note 8; WARWICK MCKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983).
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pletely ignored, was not addressed in the early United Nations texts
mainly because several member states were dealing with minority
problems and the discredit of the inter-war system.12
An important exception to the international community’s failure
to address group rights was the International Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide
Convention”), adopted on December 9, 1948, one day before the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.13 Article II of the Genocide
Convention specifically includes in the notion of genocide the intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a “religious group.”14 Although the
victims of the crime will always be individuals, the target of the crime
is the group, be it religious or otherwise. The Genocide Convention
clearly addresses crimes such as those committed in the 1990s under
the guise of “ethnic—meaning also religious— cleansing.”15
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Except for prohibiting the discrimination of persons on religious
grounds, the United Nations Charter does not deal specifically with
religious rights. The first United Nations instrument to address the
subject was the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“Universal Declaration”).16 The seminal Article 18 greatly influenced the 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,17 the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,18 the re-

12. See Lerner, supra note 8; THORNBERRY, supra note 8; Lerner, Religious Human
Rights under the United Nations, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 79, 85-86.
13. For the text of the Genocide Convention, see INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS 130.1 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS]. On the subject generally, see NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (1960).
14. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 130.1. Article II refers to “national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such.” Id.
15. On the international community’s response to ethnic cleansing in the 1990s, see
infra Part IV.D.
16. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 440.1. On the Universal
Declaration, see generally John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its
History, Impact and Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS, THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 21 (1979); NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN, SIGNIFICANCE, APPLICATION, AND
INTERPRETATION (1958); and THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A
COMMENTARY (Asbjørn Eide and Gudmundur Alfredsson eds., 1992), particularly Martin
Scheinin’s article, Article 18, contained therein at 263.
17. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 180.1.
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gional treaties, and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms
of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief
(“1981 Declaration”).19 It reads:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or
whatever belief of his choice, and freedom either individually or in
community with others and in public or private to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.20

Article 18 consists of three parts. First, it guarantees the right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, generally described as
the forum internum.21 This is a broad category, which includes the
right to profess a religion or to profess none, i.e., to believe or not
believe. The term “belief” twice follows the term “religion.”22 “Belief” should be interpreted strictly in connection with the word “religion.” It does not refer to political, economic, scientific, or other
beliefs. The term “belief” was incorporated into the Universal Declaration to protect the right to profess nonreligious or atheistic convictions.
It may be legitimate to consider the freedoms of conscience and
religion as included in the freedom of thought. However, freedom of
conscience was not universally considered a consolidated legal concept at the time of the drafting of Article 18. This freedom is frequently discussed under the heading of “conscientious objection,”
not an exclusively religion-related issue. The reference to “freedom
of conscience” was incorporated despite some opposition. The
phrase refers to pacifism, obedience to superior orders, the power of
the state to impose obligations in areas such as taxation, and other
controversial problems regarding matters of principle for the individual.
Second, Article 18 addresses conversion and religious proselyting,23 issues that became more difficult when the 1966 Covenants
and the 1981 Declaration were drafted.24 By the time those docu18. See id. at 170.1.
19. See id. at 490.1.
20. Id. at 490.2.
21. See id. at 440.4.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. For a discussion of the 1966 Covenants and the 1981 Declaration, see infra Part
IV.C.3 and Part IV.C.4, respectively.
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ments were drafted, the right to teach and disseminate one’s religion
and to conduct proselyting activities became controversial matters.
Those matters are beyond the scope of this article. They may sometimes involve a clash with rights such as privacy, interference with the
integrity of some group identities—as when ethnicity and religion
are closely related—and even illegal acts. Such illegal acts may include the abuse of conversion and proselyting rights, coercion of
“captive audiences,” and the use of improper enticements.
Third, Article 18 addresses the external forum or, put another
way, the manifestations of religious freedom.25 Unlike freedom of
thought and conscience, which can only be limited by complicated
psychological techniques that influence the human mind, problems
arise regarding manifestations of religious rights because those rights
are more likely to be derogated. Given these problems, this aspect of
religious freedom deserves special scrutiny.
2. The Krishnaswami study
Arcot Krishnaswami’s study,26 submitted in 1959, was an important step in the United Nations’ identification and protection of religious freedoms.27 The study was based on information contained in
82 country monographs and established principles that the SubCommission later adopted, and which had considerable influence on
future documents. The 1981 Declaration28 and pending Draft Convention29 incorporate many of its principles. The study did not define
the term “religion” but did clarify that the term “beliefs” included
attitudes concerning religion such as agnosticism, atheism, and rationalism, in addition to theistic creeds. However, these terms are
not defined either.
Krishnaswami analyzed the notions of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion as legal rights.30 He referred to the prohibition
of discrimination, dealt with the crucial issue of proselyting and conversion, and detailed the contents of the right to manifest religion, as

25. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 440.4.
26. Krishnaswami was appointed as Special Rapporteur by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.
27. See KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 9.
28. For a discussion of the 1981 Declaration, see infra Part IV.C.4.
29. For a discussion of the Draft Convention, see infra Part IV.C.4.
30. See KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 9, at 13-14.
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well as permissible limitations on it.31 He also dealt with the nature
and rights of religious organizations; the relationship between those
organizations and their members; and the scope of the concepts of
teaching, practice, worship, and observance, embracing all possible
manifestations of religion.32 Krishnaswami stressed the collective aspects of religious rights: assembly, association, organization, and international ties and contacts.33
Krishnaswami’s catalog of religious rights embraces worship,
processions, pilgrimages, symbols, funeral practices, marriage and divorce, teaching, and appointment of personnel.34 He also lists permissible limitations on religious rights and discusses oaths, objection
to military service and other conscientious objections, compulsory
medical treatment, and other particularly difficult issues.35 Further,
he discusses different approaches to the state-religion and statereligious community relationship.36
3. The 1966 Covenants
The United Nations took the next step in identifying and protecting religious rights when it promulgated the 1966 International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights37 and the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.38 Eighteen
years had elapsed since the adoption of the Universal Declaration.
Despite the evolution of legal thought during that time, which influenced instruments such as the 1965 Convention on Racial Discrimination (“1965 Convention”),39 the text of the 1966 Covenants re-

31. See id. at 16-18.
32. See id. at 15, 18-19.
33. See id. at 18-19.
34. See id. at 26-36.
35. See id. at 36-39.
36. See id. at 39-46.
37. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 180.1.
38. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.1. Some of the many
works on the 1966 Covenants are Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 126 (Philip Alston ed., 1992); DOMINIC
MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1991); HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Theodor Meron ed., 1991); and MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1993); Partsch, supra note 6, at 209.
39. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 160.1.
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flects the Universal Declaration’s general orientation and trends.40
This can be attributed to the slow drafting process and the impact of
weighty philosophical and political issues on the process, including
conversion, proselyting, and the conflict between universal human
rights and cultural relativism. Although several other internationally
binding instruments, some of which were widely ratified, contain
provisions related to religious rights,41 the 1966 Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights is presently the only binding treaty specifically
containing a coherent articulation of such rights.42 The Human
Rights Committee, which implements the 1966 Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, also gave considerable attention to the subject,
as evidenced by its issuance of a specific General Comment in
1993.43 This Comment is of great value in interpreting religious
norms.
Articles 18, 19, 20, and 27 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights are relevant to religious rights.44 Article 18 is seminal. The first paragraph generally tracks the language in Article 18 of
the Universal Declaration, with minor changes.45 The Covenant’s
Article 18 does not, however, explicitly refer to the right to change
one’s religion.46 In an effort to compromise, it reads: “The right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion [the inner forum] . . .
shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
choice.”47 Most specialists interpret the Covenant’s Article 18 as fully
recognizing the right to change religion, as proclaimed by the Universal Declaration.48 But its failure to explicitly protect the right to
change religion began a downward trend, which became more

40. See supra Part IV.C.1.
41. See Lerner, supra note 12, at 79.
42. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.1.
43. For its text, see Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22, Article 18,
48th Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1, at 35 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment No.
22].
44. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.7-170.8, 170.10.
45. See id. at 170.7.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Partsch, supra note 6, at 210-11; Martin Scheinin, Article 18, in THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 16, at 263; J.A.
Walkate, The Right of Everyone to Change His Religion or Belief, 30 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 146,
153 (1983).

914

LERN-FIN.DOC

905]

9/25/00 9:48 PM

Nature and Minimum Standards

pronounced and very problematic during the preparation and adoption of the 1981 Declaration.
Article 18(2) prohibits “coercion” that would impair a person’s
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief.49 The text does not
define “coercion,” but it should be read as meaning not only the use
of force or threats but also more subtle forms of illegitimate influence, such as family considerations, public standing, and social relations. Use of such tactics is less than illegal, but so are some material
enticements.
Article 18(3) deals with limitations50 on the freedom to manifest
one’s religion or belief “as are prescribed by law and are necessary to
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others.”51 Article 4 of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights incorporates the whole of Article 18 as an article
that cannot be derogated even in times of public emergency.52
Significantly, Article 18 does not mention national security as an
appropriate justification for religious discrimination by a state. In a
delicate area such as religious rights, limitations must be interpreted
narrowly. Article 18 only permits limitations upon manifestations or
the practice of religion, namely the external forum, if such limitations
are prescribed by law.53 The internal forum cannot be restricted or
limited. This distinction is, of course, of the greatest importance. Judicial bodies in several countries have, out of necessity, intervened in
religious practices such as the slaughtering of animals, the wearing of
turbans, skullcaps, veils and head-coverings, the growing of beards,
and work on specific days. Moreover, some religious groups’ rites,
customs, and rules of behavior clash with public order and morality
norms of the general population in areas such as education, health,
gender, and family law. This is a delicate issue, in which there may be
frequent clashes between what a society may consider its minimum

49. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.8.
50. On limitations in the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see Thomas
Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 72, 78-91, and Alexandre Charles Kiss,
Permissible Limitations on Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at
290, 295-310.
51. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.8.
52. See id. at 170.2. Articles 29(2) and 29(3) of the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights are also relevant.
53. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.8.
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legal standard and minority religions’ religious attitudes grounded in
history and culture.54
The last paragraph of Article 18 deals with parental rights in the
field of education, a highly sensitive area.55 The UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education,56 the 1981 Declaration,57
the Convention on the Rights of the Child,58 and other global and
regional texts address this subject. International judicial or quasijudicial decisions on the topic have also been numerous.
Article 19 deals generally with freedom of expression.59 Article
20(2) imposes upon states that are parties to the 1966 Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights the duty to prohibit by law the advocacy of
religious hatred that incites to discrimination, hostility, or violence.60
Several states objected and entered reservations to Article 20(2), seeing in it a limitation on freedom of expression.61 Article 20(2) should
be compared with Article 4 of the 1965 Convention.62 The Human
Rights Committee, in its General Comment on Article 20, stressed
Article 20(2)’s mandatory character and full compatibility with freedom of expression.63
Article 27 deals with minorities, including religious minorities.64
Scholars are divided on the merits of Article 27 and the scope of its
protection.65 Moreover, Article 27 has, to some extent, been superseded by the 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Per-

54. For an examination of these issues, see Leon Sheleff, Tribal Rites and Legal Rights,
18 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 153 (1988); Aviam Soifer, Freedom of Association:
Indian Tribes, Workers, and Communal Ghosts, 48 MD. L. REV. 350 (1989); and Donna J.
Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict Resolution,
24 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 795 (1992).
55. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.8.
56. See id. at 330.1.
57. See id. at 490.1.
58. See id. at 423.1.
59. See id. at 170.8.
60. See id.
61. See SIEGHART, supra note 6, at 450, for details of reservations and interpretations
entered to article 20.
62. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 160.3-160.4.
63. See Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 11, Article 20, 19th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 12 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment No. 11].
64. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.10.
65. The controversy primarily concerns whether Article 27 protects only individuals or
minority groups as well. Tomuschat takes the first view, while Ermacora, Dinstein, and Capotorti are in favor of a more group-oriented interpretation. See LERNER, supra note 10, at 15.
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sons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.66 It can also be argued that the 1992 Declaration is a rather
timid approach to the issue of minorities’ rights.67
The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 22(48)
on Article 18 stresses that the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is “far-reaching and profound.”68 Article 18
protects theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion.69 It is not limited to traditional religions.70 It distinguishes between freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief—protected unconditionally—from the freedom to manifest
religion or belief.71 Paragraph 4 lists a broad range of acts encompassed in the freedom to manifest religion or belief, to be exercised
individually or in community with others.72 The freedom to “have or
to adopt” a religion or belief includes the right to replace one’s religion with another or to adopt atheistic views.73 Coercion in this respect is barred.74 Paragraph 6 regards religious education and parental rights.75 Paragraph 7 reiterates the obligatory character of Article
20 of the Covenant, which prohibits advocacy of religious hatred.
Paragraph 8 permits limitations only if they are prescribed by law and
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the
fundamental rights of others.76 Article 18(3), on limitations, should
be strictly interpreted.77 Paragraphs 9 and 10 address discrimination
when there is a state religion or if a set of beliefs is treated as official
ideology.78 Conscientious objection is the subject of Paragraph 11.79
The General Comment on Article 18 should be viewed as an authoritative interpretation of the scope of Article 18 by the body in

66. See 1 UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS 140 (1994) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS].
67. See LERNER, supra note 1, at 15.
68. See General Comment No. 22, supra note 43.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
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charge of implementation of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. It is also relevant to the interpretation of the 1981 Declaration, to be discussed below.
4. The 1981 Declaration 80
Proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations
on November 25, 1981, the 1981 Declaration is presently the most
important global instrument regarding religious rights. Although not
binding, the 1981 Declaration, like all solemn declarations of the
United Nations General Assembly, implies an expectation of observance. It has its origin, together with the draft convention still pending (“Draft Convention”), in the anti-Semitic events of 1959 and
1960 (“swastika epidemics”) that prompted the United Nations to
start its unfinished legislative process regarding manifestations of racial and religious discrimination and intolerance.81 The reasons for
the United Nations’ delayed action regarding religious freedoms
have been recounted repeatedly, and the reasons for the interruption
of the drafting of a convention in the areas of religion or belief are
well known.82 International politics have undoubtedly played a major
role. In light of this, the 1981 Declaration is clearly the United Nations’ most ambitious achievement in this sphere to date, despite the
fact that most of its provisions already exist in other binding instruments. The 1981 Declaration permits measures of implementation.
Various Special Rapporteurs have already been appointed, and those
Special Rapporteurs have produced an extremely valuable body of information. The system requires improvement, but its usefulness is
obvious.
The 1981 Declaration took a clear stand with regard to the scope
of the term “religion.” The 1981 Declaration defines “religion” to
80. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 490.1.
81. General Assembly Resolution 1510 (XV), dated Dec. 12, 1960. For the work of the
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities after the incidents, see U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/800, para. 163 (1960); and Resolutions 3(XII) and
6(XVI) on the Commission of Human Rights (1960). For an analysis of the 1981 Declaration, see LERNER, supra note 10, at 75-96; and Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of
Religion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and
Discrimination, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 487 (1988).
82. See LERNER, supra note 10, at 46. For the reasons why the United Nations treated
religious issues differently than other human rights issues, see also Antonio Cassese, The General Assembly: Historical Perspective 1945-1989, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 37.
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include “beliefs,” namely nontheistic convictions related to religion,
such as atheism, rationalism, agnosticism, and other “beliefs,” provided those convictions are related to religion.83 Beliefs related to
politics, social, or economic issues are not included. The controversy
regarding issues of conversion and proselyting, present at all stages in
the 1981 Declaration’s preparation, threatened to prevent the General Assembly from adopting the Declaration. The controversy, however, was remedied by a compromise incorporated into Article 8 of
the 1981 Declaration, which preserves the applicability of the norms
of the Universal Declaration and the 1966 Covenants.84 This controversy nevertheless weakened the text of the 1981 Declaration. Two
decades of protracted and difficult negotiations were required to
reach a compromise. Even if one accepts the view of commentators
who consider the differences in wording between the Universal Declaration and the 1981 Declaration to be insubstantial, one cannot
ignore the argument that the differences may prevent the Declaration from being viewed as part of customary law applicable to some
societies.
One of the deficiencies of the 1981 Declaration is the imprecise
use of the terms “discrimination,” clearly a legal concept, and “intolerance,” a rather vague concept referring essentially to emotional,
psychological, philosophical, and other attitudes likely to generate
discrimination, hatred, or persecution.85 In fact, the 1981 Declaration gives both words equivalent meaning.86 Moreover, the 1981
Declaration, unlike the Draft Convention, does not incorporate provisions on incitement to intolerance or discrimination on religious
grounds. The need and desire to compromise in drafting the 1981
Declaration are reflected in the references to conversion, missionary
activities and the right to teach and propagate a religion, and the
right to leave a religion. They continue the descent already mentioned in the above discussion on the respective provisions in the
83. See LERNER, supra note 10, at 80-81.
84. See id.
85. WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
(1971), defines “intolerant” as “refusing to allow others the free enjoyment of their opinions
or worship.” Elizabeth Odio Benito, Study of the Current Dimensions of the Problems of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/26, at 3
(1987), states that manifestations of intolerance, often extending far beyond discrimination,
include stirring up hatred against or even persecuting individuals or groups of a different religion or belief.
86. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 490.2.
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1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The prohibition of discrimination is vague and requires further elaboration. Not every
preference based on religion or belief is discriminatory. For example,
comparative legislation on religious rights sometimes prefers religions, treats religions differently, and draws distinctions between religions that respond to social and historic realities. In some cases, legislation may be discriminatory; in other cases, it may not. Common
sense is the key, particularly since the 1981 Declaration prohibits discrimination, not only by the state, but also by institutions, groups,
and persons.87
Despite these shortcomings, the 1981 Declaration text constitutes a far-reaching catalog of generally recognized human rights related to religion or belief. Where the 1981 Declaration is unclear,
authoritative interpretations of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are helpful.88 The 1981 Declaration follows the pattern
of the Covenant in drawing the distinction between basic rights in
the inner forum—thought, conscience, and religion—and the external manifestations of religion—worship, observance, practice, and
teaching.89 Only external manifestations, which are in some cases
listed, may be limited if such limitations are prescribed by law and
necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the
fundamental rights of others.90 The 1981 Declaration does not distinguish the rights of nationals and the rights of aliens.
The catalog of religious rights is listed in the comprehensive, but
not exhaustive, text of Article 6.91 It includes the right to worship
and assemble and to maintain places for this purpose; to establish institutions; to make, acquire, and use materials necessary to the religion; to produce relevant publications; to teach the religion in suitable
places; to receive financial contributions; to train and appoint appropriate leaders; to observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and
ceremonies; and to communicate with individuals and communities

87. See id.
88. See, e.g., Partsch, supra note 6; General Comment No. 22, supra note 43.
89. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 490.3-490.4.
90. See id. at 490.2. On several occasions, the Human Rights Committee and the European Court on Human Rights dealt with the scope of permissible limitations. The European
Court clarified the meaning of “morals” in Handyside v. UK, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1976).
91. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 490.3-.4.
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on religious matters at the national and international levels.92 Some
of these same rights appear in Articles 16 and 17 of the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (“CSCE”) 1989 Concluding Document of the Vienna meeting.93
On the whole, the 1981 Declaration is a reasonably good text,
which, more or less, reflects the international community’s present
understanding of the minimum standard for matters of religious
rights. It is to be noted that the Special Rapporteurs appointed since
1986 have been performing the role usually assigned to formal
mechanisms incorporated into mandatory treaties.94 There is certainly room for improvement, and some recommendations have been
advanced to that effect. But this does not detract from the positive
aspects of the document, which enlarges the scope of specific articles
in the obligatory 1966 Covenants. So long as no progress is made on
the Draft Convention, and there are no signs of such progress, the
1981 Declaration is a very positive step in the international effort to
ensure human religious rights.
5. Other global provisions
International human rights should be viewed as a universal, allembracing system of rights. The specific provisions on religion and
belief must be considered in connection with other norms adopted
by the international community and with regional instruments regulating religion or belief in some parts of the world. Religion is a
wide-reaching spiritual, social, and political phenomenon. Many facets of life are covered by rules dealing with religion or belief.
For these reasons, after the adoption of the United Nations
Charter and the early instruments directly concerned with issues involving religion or belief, such as the Genocide Convention and the
Universal Declaration, many international law documents, although
mainly directed toward the protection of other specific rights, also

92. See id. However, rights considered but omitted include the rights to observe dietary
practices, to make pilgrimages, and not to be coerced to take an oath of a religious nature.
93. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 403 (1995)
(emphasizing the rights of religious communities in Principle 16.4); see also W. COLE
DURHAM, JR., FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: LAWS AFFECTING THE STRUCTURING OF
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES (1999).
94. Not being a treaty, the 1981 Declaration did not establish such a mechanism. The
Reports submitted by the Special Rapporteurs do not differ, however, from similar documents
to be submitted under treaty obligations.
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address religious rights. Among those international law documents,
the following deserve mentioning:
• The Genocide Convention.95
• Humanitarian law, consolidated in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and 1977 Protocols.96
• The Declaration and Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination.97 This is an appropriate guideline for state action in the field of religious
prejudice, intolerance, and discrimination, which includes
the difficult subject of prohibiting and incriminating
group discrimination, incitement, and hatred in general.
• The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women.98 It is impossible to
ignore the clash between gender equality and religious
practices difficult to eliminate from some traditions, particularly where the personal status law is part of the law of
the state.99
• The 1960 UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination
in Education.100 This contains norms on the establishment of separate educational systems for religious reasons
and on parental rights.101 These norms should be compared to those included in the Convention on the Rights
of the Child102 and have been the subject of frequent judicial or quasi-judicial adjudication.103
• The 1958 International Labor Organization Convention
(No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Em95. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 130.1. See supra Part IV.C
and infra Part IV.E for discussions of the Genocide Convention.
96. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 70.1, 80.1, 90.1, 100.1,
200.1, 210.1.
97. See id. at 160.1.
98. See id. at 220.1. On the Convention generally, see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 53 (1986).
99. See Sullivan, supra note 54, at 795. This article contains an extensive bibliography
on women’s rights. See also HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 71-117 (Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul Mahoney eds., 1993).
100. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 330.1.
101. See id. at 330.2.
102. See id. at 423.3.
103. See, e.g., Belgian Linguistic Case, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1968); Kjeldsen et.
al., 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1976); Angelini v. Sweden, 10 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
123 (1988).
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•

•

While
minimum

ployment and Occupation.104 The quasi-judicial supervisory bodies of the International Labor Organization
(“ILO”) had to deal, on many occasions, with issues regarding religious rights of employees, frequently in connection with holy days and days of rest.105 Another interesting ILO treaty in this context is the 1989 Convention
(No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries,106 a partial revision of the 1957
Convention. The new instrument, strongly grouporiented, protects the identities (including religious) of
indigenous populations with a view toward ensuring respect for the religious and spiritual values and practices of
the interested populations as groups and as individuals.107
The 1990 U.N. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families.108 This convention contains provisions for
the satisfaction of the cultural and religious needs of such
migrants and contains an article inspired by Article 18 of
the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.109
The 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities.110 This declaration implies some
progress as compared to Article 27 of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. Its relationship to religious
rights is limited.
many of the listed provisions are consistent with the
standard111 for religious rights, contradictory rules (and in

104. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 320.1.
105. For the work of the ILO and its struggle against discrimination, see generally N.
Valticos, The International Labor Organization, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 363 (Karel Vasak ed., 1979).
106. See HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 475. For an analysis of the 1989 Convention
(No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Populations or Peoples, see LERNER, supra note
10, at 99-114.
107. See HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 475.
108. See HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 554.
109. See id. For a critical analysis, see Ved P. Nanda, The Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers, 2 ASIAN AND PAC. MIGRATION J. 161 (1993).
110. See HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 140. For a comparison with other provisions
on minorities, see LERNER, supra note 1, at 33-35.
111. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR
CONSENSUS 6 (Abdullah Ahmed An-Naim ed., 1992); Fernando R. Teson, International
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some cases even divergent principles) have developed in areas such as
gender and minority rights. This, again, raises the issue of universality versus cultural relativism with respect to some major religions,
new religions, and sects in particular.
6. Regional norms and special agreements 112
A study of religious rights cannot ignore the following: the 1950
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms;113 the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights;114 the documents adopted by the Organization (formerly Conference) on Security and Co-operation in Europe;115 and
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.116 These instruments should be compared to the global rules.
At the European level particularly, a comprehensive and important jurisprudence has developed as a consequence of the work of the
European Court and former European Commission on Human
Rights. These European bodies adjudicated issues such as the mandatory use of crash helmets, compulsory membership in health services, compulsory insurance, religious needs of prisoners, the status
of religious congregations, the rights of the clergy, parental rights,
conscientious objection, taxation, blasphemy, the status of minor
and new religious groups, and the relationship between churches and
their members.117 This created an interesting body of jurisprudence

Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 4251 (Richard Claude & Burns H. Weston eds., 2d ed. 1992); Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1984). Volume 16(2) of the Human
Rights Quarterly carries several articles on the subject. See 16 HUM. RTS. QT. 235 (1994).
112. An in-depth discussion of the protection of religious rights by regional instruments
is beyond the scope of this Article.
113. See 213 U.N.T.S. 211 (1993). There is vast literature on the protection of human
rights in Europe. For a recent comprehensive book, see EVANS, supra note 1.
114. See 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970). On the American system generally, see THOMAS
BUERGENTHAL ET AL., PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS (1995); SCOTT
DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM (1997).
115. For the Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”) documents, see COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 93. For a discussion of the OSCE’s work in general, see THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (Arie Bloed ed.,
1993). See also DURHAM, supra note 93.
116. For the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, see 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
See also U. OJI UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS
(1997).
117. See generally, EVANS, supra note 1.

924

LERN-FIN.DOC

905]

9/25/00 9:48 PM

Nature and Minimum Standards

and contributed to the interpretation of the basic rules concerning
religious rights. The issue of new religions and sects has recently become very controversial in Europe, and a recent Council of Europe
statement regarding this issue has drawn attention.118 Principles 16
and 17 of the 1989 Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting
of the CSCE deserve special mention also because of their detailed
coverage of religious rights.119 These principles should be compared
with those religious rights listed in the 1981 Declaration.
Although not precisely regional arrangements, some states have
entered into bilateral agreements with churches and religious communities, providing a framework for the solution and clarification of
different problems in this area. Spain, for instance, has entered into
such agreements with different religious communities.120 Also noteworthy is the 1993 agreement between the State of Israel and the
Holy See preceding the establishment of diplomatic relations between them.121 This agreement refers to the protection of Catholic
interests in Israel and to the Catholic Church’s condemnation of
anti-Semitism.122 The agreement has been described as the first
agreement between the Holy See and a non-Christian state.123
D. Protection from Persecution
Although international law adequately addressed racial discrimination (though the issue of implementation is not always resolved
satisfactorily), there remains a strongly felt need to protect religious
groups from discrimination, persecution, and incitement.124 Interna118. See Official Press Release of the Council of Europe, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE
COUNCIL (June 1999).
119. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 93.
120. See SPANISH LEGISLATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa
María Martízez de Codes eds., 1998).
121. See Holy See-Israel: Fundamental Agreement, 33 I.L.M. 153 (1994).
122. See id.
123. See Silvio Ferrari, Concordats were Born in the West, 12/13 LA PORTA D’ORIENTE
37-44 (1998); Natan Lerner, Protecting Religious Human Rights by Bilateral Arrangements,
12/13 LA PORTA D’ORIENTE 45-55 (1998).
124. The controversial International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105292, 112 Stat. 2787 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (1998)), calls upon the President of the
United States to take a range of diplomatic and other actions against any country that engages
in or tolerates violations of religious freedom. See id. at § 6441. See also the detailed list of violations of religious rights in many countries included in the reports of Special Rapporteur, Abdelfattah Amor, supra note 4. See also FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD
REPORT (Kevin Boyle & Juliet Sheen eds., 1997), which covers persecution against various
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tional and domestic law must also address the defamation and libel
of groups or of persons belonging to a group for their membership
in the group, even though such defamation and libel is less dramatic
than physical persecution.125
The developing trend is to make the prohibition of religious discrimination, like the prohibition of racial discrimination, a peremptory norm of international law or, in other words, jus cogens.126 Hatred and intolerance, admittedly less precise terms, are mentioned in
some provisions addressing incitement to hatred, intolerance, and
other related evils. But it is still necessary to harmonize basic rights,
such as freedom of speech or of association on the one hand, and, on
the other hand, the right of collective entities and their members not
to be subjected to libel, defamation, hostility, intolerance, or incitement to hatred. The highly relevant issue of whether punishment
should be enhanced for crimes committed on religious or racial
grounds must also be resolved.
The various instruments referenced above contain provisions to
protect religious and other groups. The Genocide Convention, for
example, protects religious groups’ right to exist.127 Similarly, Article
19 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights authorizes
limitations upon the freedom of expression to protect “the rights
and reputations of others.”128 Article 20 prohibits the advocacy of
national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.129 The Human Rights Committee,
in its General Comment on Article 20, affirms that the prohibition is
fully compatible with other freedoms.130 Likewise, Articles 10(2) and
11(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights restrict the
freedom of expression, assembly, and association when necessary in a

religious groups in different countries.
125. On this controversial issue, see, for example, Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Harm Principle, Offence Principle, and the Skokie Affair, 41 POL. STUD. 453 (1993); Kenneth Lasson,
Racial Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 11 (1985); and Natan Lerner, Group Libel Revisited, 17 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 184 (1987).
126. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 n.29 (4th
ed. 1990).
127. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 130.1.
128. Id. at 170.8
129. See id.
130. General Comment No. 11, supra note 63.
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democratic society to “protect[] . . . the reputation . . . of others.”131
The American Convention on Human Rights refers to the right of
“everyone” to have his honor and dignity respected, liability to protect the “reputations of others,” and penalties for “advocat[ing] . . .
national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute[s] incitement[] to
lawless violence or to any other similar action against any person or
group of persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin.”132 The 1981 Declaration calls
upon states to take “all necessary measures . . . to . . . combat discrimination on the ground of religion or belief.”133 The 1978
UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice urges the mass
media and all organized groups to refrain from presenting “a stereotyped, partial, unilateral or tendentious picture of individuals and of
various human groups.”134 The 1990 Charter of Paris for a New
Europe states the determination of its signatories “to combat all
forms of racial and ethnic hatred, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and
discrimination against anyone, as well as persecution on religious and
ideological grounds.”135
The main provisions prohibiting incitement against groups,
communities, and collective entities are contained in the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“1965 Convention”), ratified by 155 states as of August 1999.136 Article 4 of the 1965 Convention contains provisions
concerning incitement, hatred, and hostility against persons and
groups.137 It is a controversial article and was subject to criticism and
formal reservations. Article 4 has, however, become an important
guideline for states, and several have enacted domestic legislation in

131. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, art. 10(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
132. American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 9 I.L.M. 673.
133. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 490.3.
134. See HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 132.
135. See 2 UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS 406 (1994).
136. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 160.1; see generally NATAN
LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY (1970); G. Tenekides, L’Action des Nationes Unies Contre
la Discrimination Raciale, RECUEIL DES COURS III 269 (1980). See also the Reports of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), the most recent of which
(at the time of publication of this Article) is indexed as U.N. Doc. A/54/18 (1999).
137. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 160.3-160.4.
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the spirit of its provisions.138 Article 4 is undoubtedly relevant to religious rights. Its text was a compromise between, on the one hand,
those who sought primarily to penalize not only “incitement to discrimination” but also the “dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred,” and, on the other hand, those who considered
such penalties a threat to the basic freedoms of speech and association.139 As is frequently the case with such compromise, the text
adopted is not entirely satisfactory and contains shortcomings.
Nevertheless, the obligations that Article 4 imposes are considered mandatory. State parties are bound to enact implementation
legislation in accordance with it, even if they allege that racial discrimination or racist organizations do not exist in their jurisdiction.140 However, in order to avoid interpretations that states might
consider incompatible with their constitutional systems, the opening
paragraph of Article 4 contains a sentence clarifying that measures to
be adopted shall be “with due regard to the principles embodied in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”141 Nevertheless, where
rights clash, the orientation of Article 4 is that freedom of speech or
association cannot be invoked to prevent a state from taking legal
measures, including penal action, against violations of the 1965
Convention.
Article 4 is presently one of the most ambitious provisions in international law intended to fight not only racial discrimination but all
related evils, such as racial hatred, racial propaganda, and associations
with a racist purpose.142 Even though there are few references to religion in the text of the 1965 Convention (because of the decision to
separate the instruments on race from those on religion), it seems
beyond any doubt that Article 4 acts as a guideline to interpret the
provisions of the 1981 Declaration.
E. International Criminal Law
Post-war international law had to respond to the lessons of the
most costly conflict in history, in terms of human lives. Those con138. See JOSE D. INGLES, STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, U.N. Sales
No. E.85.XIV.2 (1986).
139. LERNER, supra note 1, at 53.
140. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 160.3-160.4.
141. Id.
142. See id.
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structing an international order to preserve peace and prevent horrendous crimes, like those committed before and during World War
II, were conscious of the need to avoid the recurrence of criminal
policies directed against specific groups, religious or otherwise. One
of the first human rights treaties adopted by the United Nations was
the Genocide Convention,143 discussed above. The Nuremberg trials
influenced the Genocide Convention. As stated by the International
Court of Justice, it “was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose” with the intention “to condemn and punish genocide as a crime under international law involving a denial of
the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks
the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity.”144
Today, the prohibition of genocide is part of jus cogens. The
Genocide Convention does not contain measures of implementation.
Moreover, it has exercised little influence in preventing clear-cut
genocidal situations affecting religious and other groups in various
parts of the world over the past few decades. The Genocide Convention needs updating, but, on the whole, it is one of the basic instruments protecting ethnic and religious groups and addressing those
groups’ fundamental right to preserve their existence.
In the 1990s, the international community had to confront the
tragic events in former Yugoslavia known as “ethnic cleansing.” A
large body of documents, literature, and decisions dealing with the
events in this context, including those of the International Court of
Justice, already exists.145 It should be emphasized that the issue is
wider than pure “ethnicity” in its strictest sense. United Nations
Rapporteurs pointed out the severe damage suffered by religious and
cultural monuments and sites of the different religions. “Such wanton destruction,” wrote Angelo Vidal d’Almeida Ribeiro, “appears to
be part of the policy of certain groups aimed at eradicating the religious and cultural base of ethnic communities living in a given area

143. See id. at 130.1.
144. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide Case, 1970 I.C.J. 15, 23.
145. The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, as well as other United
Nations organs and treaty bodies, adopted numerous resolutions on ethnic cleansing. See, e.g.,
Natan Lerner, Ethnic Cleansing, 24 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 103 (1994);
Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, 72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 122
(1993); James C. O’Brien, The International Tribunal for Violation of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 639 (1993).
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in order to encourage their departure and prevent their eventual return.”146
As a result of these events, the Security Council established an international tribunal under Security Resolution 808 on February 22,
1993 “for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia since 1991.”147 The Security Council, invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, established the international tribunal
because of the threat to peace, the need for expedience, and the need
to create an effective and binding obligation to take action as required.148 The Security Council also adopted the international tribunal’s statute. The Security Council followed the same procedure in
establishing an international tribunal for similar crimes committed in
Rwanda.149
Both international tribunals are ad hoc institutions. They are the
first international courts dealing with war crimes and crimes against
humanity since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. In 1998, an international conference convened by the United Nations in Rome decided by a large majority to create a permanent international criminal
court to deal with war crimes and crimes against humanity.150 Such
crimes are frequently committed for religious or ethno-religious reasons.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to summarize the steps taken in international law to guarantee freedom of religion or belief. There is no
generally agreed-upon definition of “religion,” mainly because of the
desire to avoid ideological confrontations. There is, however, agreement that in modern human rights law the word “religion,” usually
followed by the word “belief” refers to theistic convictions involving

146. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/62, at 119. A spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees accused Serbians of “erasing all traces of a Muslim religious and cultural
presence.” Chuck Sudetic, U.N. Says ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ by Serbs Intensifies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 1994, at A13.
147. See 32 I.L.M. 1159-1205 (1993), containing the Secretary General’s Report and
Security Council resolutions.
148. See id.
149. Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994).
150. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (as corrected by the procès-verbaux of Nov. 10,
1998 and July 12, 1999).

930

LERN-FIN.DOC

905]

9/25/00 9:48 PM

Nature and Minimum Standards

a transcendental view of the universe and a normative code of behavior as well as atheistic, agnostic, rationalistic, and other views in
which such elements are absent. “Beliefs,” in this context, always relate to religion and exclude beliefs of a different character in the political or social fields.
The international community has not adopted a specific mandatory treaty regarding religion. There is a draft that was under negotiation for several years, but it is doubtful that work on the draft will
resume in the near future. The discussion about its need has been inconclusive. Different alternatives to the treaty have been submitted,
anticipating that such a treaty may encounter objections from states
and major religious communities. On the one hand, some fear that
pushing for a convention may result in a low common denominator
and a limited number of ratifications. On the other hand, some argue that there is obvious value in a treaty that goes beyond the articles on religious rights in the 1966 Covenant on Political and Civil
Rights and incorporates most of the principles of the 1981 Declaration. The idea of the 1965 Convention as a model is stimulating, although the situations and factors influencing both areas are undoubtedly quite different.
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration and Article 18 of the
1966 Covenant on Political and Civil Rights are the basic provisions
in the global instruments addressing religious freedom. The 1981
Declaration, although not obligatory, contains widely accepted international standards. Some of those provisions are customary international law, and a few should be seen as jus cogens, namely a rule
which cannot be altered except by the will of the international community as a whole.
There is also a monitoring system. The General Comments of
the Human Rights Committee, the reports and studies submitted by
U.N. Special Rapporteurs, the development of a reporting system,
the judicial and quasi-judicial decisions addressing some very significant issues in the area of religion, the special arrangements between
some states and religious communities or religiously-originated or
oriented communities together provide a reasonable degree of protection and provide guarantees in the tense, delicate, and explosive
area of basic religious rights.
Pending problems are numerous. They include the issue of conversion and proselyting, opting-out of religious communities, conscientious objection (not necessarily a religious issue), and the clash
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between rights in the field of religion or belief and those in other
spheres. Evidence of the tension, delicacy, and explosiveness of these
issues abounds. It can be seen in the struggle of the universal acceptance and understanding of human rights and what is loosely called
cultural particularism or relativism against the dangers of wars, genocide, and persecution stemming from religious sentiments or hatred,
of which the horrible practices of “ethnic cleansing” have been a very
recent and tragic example. Some steps in the field of international
criminal law directly relate to these excesses in matters of religious
rights. Indeed, the most powerful state in today’s world has felt the
need to enact unilateral protective measures against religious persecution abroad.
The renewed interest in the field of religious rights is a positive
development that requires an adequate, practical legislative response.
It presents a fascinating challenge for lawyers, political scientists, and
theologians. The international community must strive to reach a
consensus to incorporate rights related to religion into the widely
developed system of international human rights. Such consensus was
attained in other delicate areas affecting the sensibilities of large
groups. The new millennium is a propitious moment to review this
issue and renew work on it. No group is expected to renounce its
principles and basic ideology. However, because they are so important, religion or belief deserve an intelligent, careful, and balanced
accommodation in fundamental legal norms that provide a minimum
standard acceptable to a large majority of mankind. The instruments
discussed in this article contain many ingredients of such a standard.
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